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Domestic Effects of the Foreign Activities of
US Multinationals†
By Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley, and James R. Hines Jr.*
Do firms investing abroad simultaneously reduce their domestic
activity? This paper analyzes the relationship between the domestic
and foreign operations of US manufacturing firms between 1982 and
2004 by instrumenting for changes in foreign operations with GDP
growth rates of the foreign countries in which they invest. Estimates
produced using this instrument indicate that 10 percent greater
foreign investment is associated with 2.6 percent greater domestic
investment, and 10 percent greater foreign employee compensation
is associated with 3.7 percent greater domestic employee compensation. These results do not support the popular notion that expansions abroad reduce a firm’s domestic activity, instead suggesting
the opposite. (JEL F23, H25, L25)

T

he potential domestic impact of rapidly increasing foreign activity by US
multinational firms is a source of widespread concern. In particular, flows
of foreign direct investment (FDI) to rapidly growing foreign markets generate
fears that such investment displaces domestic employment, capital investment, and
tax revenue. An alternative perspective suggests that growing foreign investment
may increase levels of domestic activity by improving a firm’s profitability and
competitiveness. Despite the absence of strong empirical evidence resolving this
question, many US policy makers are anxious to address the perceived problem
of offshoring.
The effect of increased foreign activity by US multinational firms on their
own domestic operations turns on production and cost considerations that might
take several forms.1 A multinational firm’s total worldwide production level
could be approximately fixed, being determined by resource limits, capacity
constraints, or market competition. This would imply that foreign and domestic
factors of production are conditional substitutes and that any additional foreign
production then reduces domestic production. Alternatively, the level of total
production might not be fixed but, instead, responsive to profit opportunities
that are influenced by economic growth rates. Increases in FDI may then raise

* Desai: Harvard Business School, Baker 265, Soldiers Field, Boston, MA 02163 (e-mail: mdesai@hbs.edu);
Foley: Harvard Business School, Baker 235, Soldiers Field, Boston, MA 02163 (e-mail: ffoley@hbs.edu); Hines:
Department of Economics, University of Michigan, 611 Tappan Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1220 (e-mail:
jrhines@umich.edu).
†
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1
The text uses “domestic” to refer to the US activities of US multinational firms, and “foreign” to refer to the
non-US activities of the same companies.
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the return to domestic production, stimulating domestic factor demand and
domestic output. Firms might, for example, find that foreign operations provide
valuable intermediate inputs at low cost, or that foreign affiliates are ready buyers of tangible and intangible property produced in the United States.
This paper evaluates the extent to which increased foreign activity by US manufacturing firms influenced their domestic activities between 1982 and 2004. This exercise
employs confidential affiliate-level information on the activities of US manufacturing
firms collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). These data permit individual foreign operations to be matched to the domestic activities of the same firms.
As a result, it is possible to measure the extent to which expansions in foreign business
activity coincide with changes in domestic activity. The evidence indicates that there
is a strong positive correlation between the domestic and foreign activity levels of
multinational firms.
As foreign and domestic operations are jointly determined, this evidence can be
difficult to interpret. For example, the discovery of a new drug by a pharmaceutical company may increase its activity both abroad and at home. Alternatively, real
exchange rate movements may make it more profitable for a US firm to produce
in foreign locations and less profitable to produce in the United States, thereby
encouraging the firm to expand its foreign activities while reducing its domestic
activities, even though the foreign and domestic activities are unrelated. Without
exogenous variation in foreign activities, it is difficult to know how they affect
domestic activities.
Foreign economic growth rates offer a potential source of exogenous variation
in foreign activity levels. Since foreign investment locations differ significantly
between firms, it is possible to construct firm-specific weighted averages of foreign gross domestic product (GDP) growth. These firm-specific foreign economic
growth rates can be used to generate predicted growth rates of foreign activity that
are employed to explain changes in domestic activity. This procedure compares
two US firms, one whose foreign investments in 1982 were, for example, concentrated in Britain, and another whose foreign investments were concentrated in
France. As the British economy grew more rapidly than the French economy, the
firm with British operations should exhibit more rapid growth of foreign investment than would the firm with French operations. If the domestic activities of the
firm with British operations grow at different rates than the domestic activities of
the firm with French operations, it may be appropriate to interpret the difference
as reflecting the impact of changes in foreign operations.
Weighted foreign economic growth rates are strong predictors of subsequent foreign investment by US firms, including investment in affiliates that primarily export
their output. It appears that foreign economic growth rates do not merely capture
changes in host-country demand for foreign output but also changes in real foreign
input costs due to factor supplies, productivity, and new opportunities.
Second stage equations based on predictions that use foreign economic growth
rates to instrument for changes in foreign activity imply that 10 percent greater
foreign capital investment triggers 2.6 percent additional domestic capital investment, and that 10 percent greater foreign employee compensation is associated
with 3.7 percent greater domestic employee compensation. There are similar
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p ositive relationships between foreign and domestic changes in assets and numbers of employees.2
There are several channels through which foreign activities influence the scope
of domestic operations, including cases in which foreign production requires inputs
of tangible or intellectual property produced in the home country. The same instrumental variables method used to identify the effect of foreign investment on domestic investment indicates that greater foreign activity is associated with higher exports
from US parent companies to their foreign affiliates and with greater domestic
research and development (R&D) spending.
The positive association between changes in foreign and domestic activities persists in supplemental specifications designed to address alternative interpretations of
the main results. The use of weighted foreign economic growth rates as instruments
for changes in foreign investment has the potential to produce misleading results if
the foreign investments of firms planning rapid expansion of domestic investment
are disproportionately attracted to economies expected to grow rapidly. To address
this possibility, the residuals from regressing foreign GDP growth against lagged
GDP growth can be used instead of actual GDP growth to explain foreign investment. This substitution produces very similar results.
In order to avoid the possibility that industry-specific shocks might produce a correlation of foreign and domestic investment growth rates, the regressions reported
in this paper include fixed effects for each two-digit parent industry in each year.
Furthermore, the use of a larger set of year-specific three-digit industry fixed effects
does not change the results. Alternatively, if firms export to unaffiliated customers
located in the same countries in which they invest, foreign economic growth rates
might directly stimulate export-oriented domestic activity. This can be controlled
for by including an additional variable equal to export-weighted foreign economic
growth, which, again, does not alter the results. Finally, there are circumstances in
which real exchange rate movements that are correlated with economic growth rates
might independently influence both foreign and domestic activity, but replicating
the analysis with controls for firm-specific changes in foreign exchange rates yields
similar answers.
These results carry implications for US policies that influence the attractiveness of
foreign investment to US firms. There is a great deal of recent political concern that
greater foreign business activity, whatever its source, comes at the cost of reduced
domestic activity. This viewpoint is responsible for a number of actual and proposed
government policies. For example, recent proposals requiring US firms to abide by
US labor and regulatory standards when operating abroad would increase the cost
of certain foreign activities in the hope of making domestic operations more competitive. Those who advocate greater US taxation of active foreign business income
often do so in the belief that subjecting foreign business income to high rates of
2
The example of one large US multinational firm illustrates the relationships manifested in the large-sample
evidence. Between 2000 and 2006, Caterpillar increased its foreign employment by 49 percent so that foreign
employment constituted half of its total global employment. Over this period, Caterpillar’s US exports, a fraction
of which were sent to its foreign affiliates, grew by 104 percent, and its US employment grew by 29 percent. While
it is difficult to draw causal inferences from the experiences of individual companies, the econometric evidence
suggests that Caterpillar’s experience is typical of US firms during this period.
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tax will stimulate demand for domestic factors of production. While plausible, and
perhaps intuitive, the premise motivating these policies appears to be inconsistent
with the evidence presented in this paper. This, in turn, suggests that the conceptual
framework used to evaluate policies might be due for revision, as discussed in the
context of tax policy by Desai and Hines (2003).
Previous studies report mixed results in analyzing the impact of foreign operations
on domestic economic activity. Robert E. Lipsey (1995) analyzes a cross-section of US
multinational firms, reporting a mild positive correlation between foreign production
and domestic employment levels. Guy V. G. Stevens and Lipsey (1992) analyze the
investment behavior of seven multinational firms, concluding that investments in different locations substitute for each other due to costly external financing. The absence
of compelling instruments that satisfy the necessary exclusion restrictions complicate
the interpretation of this evidence, a problem that likewise appears in studies of aggregate FDI and domestic investment. Martin S. Feldstein (1995) analyzes decade-long
averages of aggregate FDI and domestic investment in OECD economies, reporting
evidence that direct investment abroad reduces domestic investment levels. Michael
P. Devereux and Harold Freeman (1995) come to a different conclusion in their study
of bilateral flows of aggregate investment funds between seven OECD countries,
finding no evidence of tax-induced substitution between domestic and foreign investment. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2005a) report time series evidence that foreign and
domestic investment are positively correlated for US firms. Aggregate evidence for
Australia (Isabel Faeth 2006), firm (Jörn Kleinert and Farid Toubal, 2007) and industry-level (Christian Arndt, Claudia M. Buch, and Monika Schnitzer 2007) evidence for
Germany, and industry-level evidence for Canada (Walid Hejazi and P. Pauly 2003)
likewise points to positive correlations between changes in foreign and domestic activity. Bruce A. Blonigen (2001) investigates the related question of whether foreign production by multinationals is a substitute or complement for exports, finding evidence
for both effects. The effect of foreign operations on the domestic activities of multinational firms therefore remains an open question.3
Much of the recent theoretical and empirical work on multinational firms emphasizes alternative motivations for foreign direct investment 4 or the reasons why
alternative productive arrangements5 are employed. Specifically, David Hummels,
Jun Ishii, and Kei-Mu Yi (2001); Yi (2003); and Gordon H. Hanson, Raymond J.
Mataloni Jr., and Matthew J. Slaughter (2005) emphasize the importance of vertical
specialization to international trade patterns and the expansion strategies of multinational firms. The findings of this research, that multinational firms exhibit high
3

Several studies, including S. Lael Brainard and David A. Riker (1997), Riker and Brainard (1997), Matthew
J. Slaughter (2000), Robert C. Feenstra and Gordon H. Hanson (1996, 1999), and Ann E. Harrison and Margaret
S. McMillan (2004) emphasize the link between foreign activities and domestic wages and employment.
Additionally, Blonigen and Wesley W. Wilson (1999) investigate the role of demand by multinational firms in
determining variations in the measured substitutability of foreign and domestic goods.
4
Investments are often characterized as being vertical or horizontal. The horizontal FDI view represents
FDI as the replication of capacity in multiple locations in response to factors such as trade costs, as in James R.
Markusen (1984, 2002). The vertical FDI view represents FDI as the geographic distribution of production globally in response to the opportunities afforded by different markets, as in Elhanan Helpman (1984).
5
Pol Antràs (2003); Antràs and Helpman (2004); Desai, Foley and Hines (2004); Helpman, Mark J. Melitz,
and Stephen R. Yeaple (2004); and Feenstra and Hanson (2005) analyze the determinants of alternative foreign
production arrangements.
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degrees of integrated production, are consistent with sizeable positive effects of foreign operations on domestic activity.
Section I of the paper sketches a simple framework for the analysis of growth-driven
FDI on the domestic operations of multinational firms. Section II describes the available data on US direct investment abroad. Section III presents empirical evidence of
the determinants of foreign investment levels by US firms and the impact of foreign
investment on economic activity in the United States. Section IV is the conclusion.
I. Foreign Economic Growth and the Operations of Multinational Firms

The first stages of the regressions that follow use the fact that firms differ in their
initial distributions of foreign economic activity to predict different growth rates
of subsequent activity, based on differences in the average GDP growth rates of
the countries in which their activities were initially concentrated. These predicted
growth rates then become the independent variables in second stage-equations used
to explain changes in domestic business operations. This empirical strategy takes a
firm’s initial distribution of activity among foreign countries to be exogenous from
the standpoint of subsequent changes in domestic business activity. In order to consider the merits of this strategy, it is useful to formalize the way in which foreign
economic growth influences domestic and foreign investment through production
considerations and demand conditions.
Consider a multinational firm that produces output with a production function
Q(k, k*), in which k represents inputs of domestic factors and k* represents inputs
of foreign factors; output is taken to be a concave function of each of these inputs.
The firm faces costs of c per unit of k and c* per unit of k*. Revenue is given by
R(Q, y*) (the usual demand properties imply that ∂R/∂Q > 0 and ∂2 R/∂Q2 ≤ 02 , and
y* denotes foreign economic conditions. R is a function of y* only insofar as foreign
economic conditions affect sales revenue for a given output level, presumably by
affecting the prices that output can command in local foreign markets.
The firm maximizes R(Q, y*) − (ck + c*k*), and the first order conditions for profit
maximization are:
∂Q
∂R  ___
   = c
(1) 	 ___
∂Q ∂k
∂Q
∂R  ___
(2) 	 ___
  * = c*.
∂Q ∂k
In this setting, a change in foreign costs 1c*2 affects domestic economic activity by
influencing k*, which, in turn, affects ∂Q/∂k. This can be seen by totally differentiating (1), denoting the induced change in foreign inputs by dk*, and the resulting
change in domestic inputs by dk:
∂Q ∂2 R ___
∂Q *
∂Q
∂2Q
∂2Q
∂R  c ____
___
___
_____
(3) 	 ___  ____
 
c 
 
dk
+
 
 
dk
d
+
 
 
dk
+
 
 dk* d
∂k ∂Q2 ∂k
∂Q ∂k2
∂k*
∂k∂k*
∂Q ∂2 R
 dy* = dc.
+ ___
    _____
∂k ∂Q∂y*

186

American Economic Journal: economic policy

FEBRUARY 2009

Since dc = 0, equation (3) implies that

(4) 	

∂ 2Q
∂Q ∂ 2 R
∂Q ∂Q ∂ 2 R
∂R    _____
___
 
+
 
 d dk* +  ___   _____
 dy*
c ___   ___*   ____
2
*
*
∂k
∂Q
∂k
∂k
∂Q
∂k∂k
∂Q∂y
dk =   ____________________________________
    
    
 .
2
∂ 2Q
∂Q 2 ____
∂R
R
∂
____
___
___
− c a   b   2 +       2 d
∂k ∂Q
∂Q ∂k

Since ∂ 2 R/∂Q2 ≤ 0 and ∂ 2Q/∂k2 < 0, it follows that the denominator of the right side
of equation (4) is positive.
The first term in the numerator of equation (4) is positive only if ∂ 2Q/∂k∂k* > 0
and is of sufficient magnitude to offset the negative sign of the term that includes
∂ 2 R/∂Q2. This will be the case if foreign and domestic inputs exhibit significant
complementarity in production. The second term in the numerator of equation (4) is
a demand effect. If ∂R/∂Q increases with y*, then higher values of y* will be associated with increased demand for k. This reflects the possibility that the change in
foreign economic conditions also directly affects ∂R/∂Q by influencing final output
demand, as captured by ∂ 2 R/∂Q∂y*. If foreign affiliates or parent companies sell
significant portions of their output in markets where affiliates are located, and local
demand influences the prices that output commands, then if y* is per capita income
in countries where affiliates are located, it may be the case that ∂ 2 R/∂Q∂y* > 0. As
such, the two terms in the numerator of equation (4) reveal that foreign economic
growth can influence domestic factor demand through production and demand
considerations.
Equation (4) suggests that it is possible to estimate the impact of foreign input
changes on domestic factor demands by using changes to foreign economic conditions as instruments. From equation (2), it is clear that reduced values of c* are
associated with higher levels of k*. Real values of c* are difficult to observe, but to
the extent that national economic growth is associated with productivity gains that
correspond to declining real input costs, changes in foreign income levels can serve
as y* and therefore proxies for changes in c*. For example, a shock to foreign technology might reduce real foreign factor costs and simultaneously promote foreign GDP
growth. In such a case, the change in foreign GDP can be used to predict changes in
foreign factor demand by US firms.
The second term in the numerator of equation (4) is a reminder that changes in
foreign income have the potential to affect the demand for domestic factors via output demand effects. In particular, it is possible that ∂R/∂Q is, itself, a function of y*,
since firms with foreign operations concentrated in rapidly growing countries may
find that foreign demand for their output grows faster than do firms without strong
presences in hot foreign markets. If ∂R/∂Q is an increasing function of y*, then a
change in y* will be positively correlated with changes in domestic factor demands
even if there is no production spillover, that is, even if ∂ 2Q/∂k∂k* = 0. Since some
of the policy questions raised by these demand effects differ from those triggered by
production effects, it is useful to consider the importance of the demand channel.
How might one distinguish production effects from demand effects in estimating the impact of foreign GDP growth on domestic factor demands? One method of
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doing so is to distinguish firms based on the extent to which their sales are likely to
be influenced by conditions in foreign markets. Firms whose foreign affiliates sell
relatively little in their host markets may be affected by local income growth, but
these effects are likely to reflect changes in real factor costs rather than new selling opportunities. If the second term in the numerator of equation (4) is plausibly
zero for such firms, then one is left with production effects being responsible for the
impact of foreign income growth on domestic factor demands. The evidence analyzed below is indeed consistent with this interpretation.
The possibility that foreign GDP growth influences foreign factor use because it
is correlated with sales by foreign affiliates is an issue for the interpretation of the
instrument, not its validity. In order to serve as a valid instrument, it is necessary
that the average GDP growth rate of foreign countries in which a firm invests is
conditionally uncorrelated with the residual in the second stage equation explaining
the firm’s domestic economic activity. This condition requires that foreign economic
growth affects its domestic operations only by influencing the level and character
of its foreign operations. This restriction cannot be directly tested, but reasonable
specifications of production processes within multinational firms imply that the
most likely channel by which foreign economic prosperity affects firms with local
operations is by affecting local operations.
While the preceding explanation establishes how foreign economic growth can
give rise to production and demand effects, it also offers guidance on the validity of
the instrument. There are three important scenarios in which the instrument would
be invalid, and each is considered in the empirical tests below. First, specific industrial activity might be concentrated in certain countries, and domestic and foreign
operations might experience common shocks. For example, if most of the foreign
operations of electronic component manufacturing parents were located in Taiwan,
a productivity shock to the industry could be associated with high growth in Taiwan
while the productivity shock also has a direct effect on the growth of parent firms in
the industry. The resulting possible misattribution of cause and effect can be largely
prevented by including fixed effects that are specific to individual industries and time
periods. Second, firms might export to unaffiliated customers in the same foreign
countries in which they invest, in which case foreign economic growth might stimulate exports and thereby domestic operations directly. This consideration suggests
that it is useful to control for export-driven changes in domestic activity by including
an independent variable equal to export-weighted foreign economic growth. Third,
parent firms that are trying to grow quickly may invest in countries where economies are expected to grow rapidly in the future. This scenario implies that only the
unanticipated component of foreign economic growth would be a valid instrument.
Finally, it is also possible that foreign investment by US firms affects local GDP
growth rates, making foreign GDP growth rates inadmissible as instruments in
explaining foreign investment. This effect is likely to be very small in magnitude
except for a certain number of small countries, principally tax havens, that draw
disproportionate volumes of US investment.6 Since the empirical work presented in
6
For an analysis of the effect of foreign direct investment on the GDP growth rates of small tax havens, see
Hines (2005).
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the paper uses average foreign GDP growth rates weighted by investment levels, this
consideration is unlikely to contaminate the estimated results.
II. Data and Descriptive Statistics

The empirical work presented in Section III is based on the most comprehensive
and reliable available data on the activities of US multinational firms. The BEA
Benchmark Surveys of US Direct Investment Abroad in 1982, 1989, 1994, 1999,
and 2004 provide a panel of data on the financial and operating characteristics of
US multinational firms.7 In order to limit the heterogeneity of the sample, observations are restricted to US firms with parent companies in manufacturing industries
(as defined in the BEA survey using a classification that corresponds almost exactly
to SIC codes 20–39).8 In each of the four benchmark years, all affiliates with sales,
assets, or net income in excess of certain size cutoffs of no more than $10 million in
absolute value, and their parent companies, were required to file reports. Measures
of aggregate foreign activity of individual firms are obtained by summing measures
of activity across the firm’s foreign affiliates. The surveys collect sufficient information to quantify domestic and foreign sales, assets, net property, plant and equipment, employment compensation, and employment, as well as R&D spending by the
parent company and exports from the parent company to affiliates.9
The BEA collects identifiers linking the parent company and affiliates through
time, thereby permitting the calculation of changes in domestic and foreign input
use. Growth rates are computed as ratios of changes in activity between benchmark
years to averages of beginning and ending period levels of activity. 10 Since the data
include five benchmark survey years (1982, 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004) it is possible to calculate changes in this normalized measure for at most four periods. As
the analysis considers only changes, observations of firms that initiate or terminate global activities between benchmark years are not part of the analysis for that
period.11
Table 1 presents means, medians, and standard deviations of variables used in
the regressions that follow. The instrumental variables procedure uses foreign GDP
7
The International Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act governs the collection of the data and ensures
that “use of an individual company’s data for tax, investigative, or regulatory purposes is prohibited.” Willful noncompliance with the Act can result in penalties of up to $10,000 or a prison term of one year. As a result of these
assurances and penalties, BEA believes that coverage is close to complete and levels of accuracy are high.
8
Manufacturing firms have 56 percent of the employee compensation and 56 percent of the property, plant,
and equipment of all US multinational firms in the BEA data for these years.
9
Only a limited number of firms reported US exports from parents to affiliates in 2004 due to a change in
reporting requirements. Therefore, the sample used analyzed intercompany exports and does not include observations for 2004.
10
Construction of growth rates around averages of start and end of period values has become standard procedure in the analysis of firm-level job flows, as in Steven J. Davis, John C. Faberman, and John Haltiwanger (2006).
Leo Törnqvist, Pentti Vartia, and Yrjö O. Vartia (1985) and the appendix to Davis, Haltiwanger, and Scott Schuh
(1996) compare the properties of this growth rate measure to alternatives including log changes and growth rates
calculated relative to initial values.
11
The change in foreign activity attributable to the growth of surviving parent companies is considerably
larger than the change due to net entry and exit of parent companies in each of the four periods covered by the
data. Appendix table 1 of Desai, Foley, and Hines (2005b) provides a description of changes in net foreign property, plant and equipment investment of US multinationals, decomposing these changes into the growth of surviving firms, entry by new firms, and capital reductions due to exit by firms that were previously part of the sample.
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Table 1—Descriptive Statistics
Mean

Foreign affiliate net ppe growth
Foreign affiliate asset growth
Foreign affiliate employment compensation growth
Foreign affiliate employment growth
Parent weighted GDP growth rate
Share of sales abroad
Domestic net PPE growth
Domestic asset growth
Domestic employment compensation growth
Domestic employment growth
Parent R&D growth
Growth of parent exports to affiliates
GDP growth weighted by parent trade
Change in real exchange rate

0.3127
0.4071
0.3191
0.1141
0.2368
0.3237
0.1295
0.3121
0.2164
20.0030
0.1922
0.2664
0.2329
20.1229

Median

Standard
deviation

0.3313
0.4275
0.3467
0.1088
0.2091
0.2579
0.0952
0.3078
0.2377
0.0005
0.2945
0.4013
0.2093
20.0807

0.8245
0.7073
0.7336
0.7366
0.1036
0.2998
0.8995
0.5330
0.5066
0.4837
0.9320
1.0464
0.0962
0.2565

Notes: Growth rates of net property, plant and equipment (PPE), assets, employment compensation, and employment are computed as the ratio of the change in activity between benchmark years to the average of beginning
and ending year levels of activity. Parent weighted GDP growth rate is the weighted change, over benchmark periods, in the GDP per capita of affiliate host coutries, divided by the average of beginning and ending period values. Values of real GDP per capita in current prices are taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006). Country
weights used for each parent company equal beginning of period net PPE levels in each country. Share of sales
abroad is measured as of the beginning of each period, and is computed by aggregating sales by each affiliate to
persons outside of the affiliate’s host country and dividing by total affiliate sales. Growth rates of parent company
R&D and parent company exports to affiliates are ratios of changes between benchmark years to average values
of these measures at the beginning and end of the period. GDP Growth Weighted by Parent Trade is calculated
using weights drawn from the distribution of beginning of period parent exports. Changes in real exchange rates
are weighted changes. A change is measured as the ratio of the change of the real exchange rate to the average
of the real exchanges rates at the beginning and end of the period. The weights correspond to the distribution of
beginning of period PPE. Real exchange rates are calculated using nominal exchange rates reported in Heston,
Summers, and Aten (2006) and measures of inflation from the IMF International Financial Statistics database.

growth rates, which are calculated by dividing changes (between benchmark years)
in the GDP per capita of affiliate host countries by the average of beginning and
ending period values.12 These country growth rates are aggregated using weights
equal to a firm’s beginning of period affiliate net property, and plant and equipment in each country. To control for the possibility that GDP growth rates affect
domestic levels of activity by influencing parent company exports to final consumers abroad, some regressions include, as an independent variable, GDP growth rates
weighted by a parent company’s beginning of period exports to unrelated parties.
Some regressions also include changes in real exchange rates, which are computed
using nominal exchange rates taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006) and
measures of inflation from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database.
The real exchange rate movement is defined to equal the ratio of the change in the
dollar-equivalent real exchange rate to the average of this rate at the beginning and
end of period. Firm-specific exchange rate changes equal the product of these real
exchange rate changes and weights equal to beginning of period affiliate net property plant and equipment in each country.

12
Per capita gross domestic product is the CGDP variable reported by Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and
Bettina Aten (2006) representing incomes adjusted for purchasing power and reported in current dollars.
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Table 2—Changes in Foreign and Domestic Inputs: OLS Specifications

Dependent variable:
Constant
Foreign net PPE growth

Domestic net
PPE growth

Domestic asset
growth

Domestic
employment
compensation
growth

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

20.3257
(0.5472)

20.1270
(0.1254)

20.3041
(0.4059)

0.0565
(0.1099)

0.2018
(0.0151)

Foreign asset growth

0.3241
(0.0153)

Foreign employment
compensation growth
Foreign employment
growth

0.2454
(0.0150)
0.2263
(0.0145)

Period/industry fixed effects?
Observations
R2

Domestic
employment
growth

Y

Y

Y

Y

2,968
0.6893

3,316
0.3001

2,978
0.1904

2,968
0.1882

Notes: The dependent variables are domestic growth rates of net property, plant and equipment (PPE) (column 1), assets (column 2), employment compensation (column 3), and employment (column 4). Domestic and
foreign growth rates are ratios of changes in activity between benchmark years to averages of the beginning
and end of period values. All regressions are OLS specifications that include period/industry fixed effects.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the parent level appear in parentheses.

company level.14 The 0.2018 coefficient reported in column one of Table 2 indicates
that 10 percent higher foreign net property, and plant and equipment growth, is associated with 2 percent higher domestic net property, and plant and equipment growth
by parent companies. Asset accumulation displays a similar pattern, the 0.3241 coefficient reported in column 2 implying that 10 percent foreign asset growth is associated with 3.2 percent domestic asset growth. The regressions reported in columns 3
and 4 consider changes in labor demand. The 0.2454 coefficient reported in column
3 indicates that 10 percent higher foreign employment compensation is associated
with a 2.5 percent greater domestic employment compensation. And the 0.2263
coefficient reported in column 4 similarly implies that 10 percent higher numbers
of foreign employees is associated with 2.3 percent higher numbers of domestic
employees. Across all of these measures of multinational firm activity, the OLS
analysis suggests that increased foreign activity is associated with greater domestic
activity.
B. Instrumental Variables Specifications

The instrumental variables approach outlined above relies on the ability of foreign economic growth rates to explain changes in foreign activity levels of US multinational firms. Table 3 presents the results of regressions of growth rates of foreign
14
Information is missing for some firms in certain years, which is why sample sizes vary between specifications in Table 2.
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Table 3— Foreign GDP Growth and Changes in Foreign Input Use

Foreign net PPE
growth

Foreign asset
growth

Foreign
employment
compensation
growth

Constant

(1)
–0.4615
(0.1203)

(2)
–0.2567
(0.0986)

(3)
–0.5229
(0.0577)

(4)
0.0224
(0.5342)

Parent weighted
GDP growth rate

1.4755
(0.2888)

1.1723
(0.2368)

1.1402
(0.2711)

0.6746
(0.2536)

Y

Y

Y

Y

2,844
0.0720

3,137
0.0897

2,842
0.0715

2,834
0.0478

Dependent variable:

Period/industry
fixed effects?
Observations
R2

Foreign
employment
growth

Notes: The dependent variables are foreign growth rates of net property, plant and equipment (PPE) (column 1),
assets (column 2), employment compensation (column 3), and employment (column 4). Foreign growth rates are
ratios of changes in activity between benchmark years to averages of the beginning and end of period values.
Parent weighted GDP growth rates are the weighted changes between benchmark periods, in GDP per capita of
affiliate host countries, divided by averages of beginning and end of period values. Values of real GDP per capita
in current prices are taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006). Country weights used for each parent company equal beginning of period net PPE levels in each country. All regressions are OLS specifications that include
period/industry fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the parent level appear in parentheses.

activity on firm-specific weighted averages of foreign economic growth rates, the
weights corresponding to beginning of period distributions of foreign property,
and plant and equipment. Growth rates are defined as in Table 2. All specifications
include period-industry fixed effects, and the standard errors correct for clustering
at the parent company level.
The results indicate that the economic performance of foreign economies significantly influences the foreign activity of US multinational firms. The 1.4755 coefficient reported in column 1 indicates that 2 percent faster annual average GDP
growth in countries in which a firm invests is associated with 3 percent faster growth
of affiliate net property, plant and equipment. Similar results appear in the regressions reported in columns 2–4, in which coefficients imply that 2 percent faster
annual GDP growth is associated with 2.3 percent greater foreign asset accumulation, 2.3 percent greater foreign employee compensation growth, and 1.3 percent
greater foreign employment growth.
As discussed above, foreign economic growth is associated with greater levels
of foreign activity by US firms either because economic growth increases the value
of the foreign output of US firms or because foreign economic growth coincides
with reduced real input costs due to productivity gains or other changes. In order to
consider these distinct channels, it is useful to identify the impact of foreign GDP
growth on export sales by foreign affiliates, as such sales presumably are little, if at
all, affected by output demand in the affiliates’ host countries. Such an exploration
addresses concerns that the instrumental variables analysis is only relevant for certain types of foreign investments, for example, those that serve local markets.
Table 4 builds on the regressions reported in Table 3 by adding a variable equal
to the average fraction of affiliate sales directed outside their own home markets.
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Table 4—Foreign GDP Growth and Changes in Foreign Input Use: Further Evidence

Foreign net PPE
growth

Foreign asset
growth

Foreign
employment
compensation
growth

Constant

(1)
–0.3462
(0.1492)

(2)
0.1192
(0.1149)

(3)
0.1257
(0.1419)

(4)
0.0700
(0.5540)

Parent weighted GDP
growth rate

1.1986
(0.3583)

0.9130
(0.2973)

0.9274
(0.3407)

0.5280
(0.3347)

Share of sales abroad

–0.2006
(0.1394)

–0.1306
(0.1110)

–0.2152
(0.1266)

–0.2153
(0.1291)

Parent weighted GDP
growth rate × share of
sales abroad

0.6569
(0.5300)

0.5606
(0.4230)

0.8638
(0.4798)

0.6961
(0.4859)

Y

Y

Y

Y

2,774
0.0726

3,049
0.0917

2,777
0.0754

2,769
0.0509

Dependent variable:

Period/Industry
fixed effects?
Observations
R2

Foreign
employment
growth

Notes: The dependent variables are foreign growth rates of net property, plant and equipment (PPE) (column 1),
assets (column 2), employment compensation (column 3), and employment (column 4). Foreign growth rates are
ratios of changes in activity between benchmark years to averages of the beginning and end of period values.
Parent weighted GDP growth rates are the weighted changes, between benchmark periods, in GDP per capita of
affiliate host countries, divided by averages of beginning and end of period values. Values of real GDP per capita in current prices are taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006). Country weights used for each parent
company equal beginning of period net PPE levels in each country. Share of sales abroad is measured as of the
beginning of each period, and it is computed by aggregating sales by each affiliate to persons outside of the affiliate's host country and dividing by total affiliate sales. All regressions are OLS specifications that include period/
industry fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the parent level
appear in parentheses.

This variable is measured as of the beginning of the period. The interaction of this
variable and weighted GDP growth indicates whether parent companies for which
affiliates sell their output outside their host markets are more or less sensitive than
others to changes in foreign economic growth rates. There are two notable features
of the results presented in this table. First, and perhaps not surprising, the coefficient
on the uninteracted GDP growth variable is positive and significant in all of the
specifications other than that explaining foreign employment growth. This implies
that capital investment and labor demand by firms for which affiliates do not export
respond positively to foreign GDP growth, which is consistent either with cost or
demand effects of foreign economic conditions. Second, and more telling, the estimated coefficients on the interaction term are positive in all four equations, albeit not
statistically significant, suggesting that there is no indication that the foreign operations of firms whose affiliates sell predominantly to host country markets are the
most sensitive to foreign economic conditions. If anything, the reverse may be true.
As such, it appears that cost considerations are important mechanisms by which
foreign economic growth influences foreign factor demand.
Table 5 presents estimated coefficients from instrumental variables regressions in
which predicted values of changes in foreign activity (based on coefficients drawn
from the regressions presented in Table 3) are used to explain changes in domestic
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Table 5—Effects of Foreign Factors on Domestic Factor Demand: IV Specifications

Domestic net
PPE growth
(1)

Domestic asset
growth
(2)

Domestic
employment
compensation
growth
(3)

Constant

1.0018
(0.0181)

0.5452
(0.0292)

0.1754
(0.0746)

Foreign net PPE growth

0.2578
(0.1184)

Dependent variable:

Foreign asset growth

0.3692
(0.1456)

Foreign employment
growth

Observations

–0.0131
(0.0052)

0.2387
(0.1260)

Foreign employment
compensation growth

IV with parent weighted
GDP growth?
Period/industry fixed effects?

Domestic
employment
growth
(4)

0.6550
(0.2771)
Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

2,844

3,137

2,842

2,834

Notes: The dependent variables are domestic growth rates of net property, and plant and equipment (PPE) (column 1), assets (column 2), employment compensation (column 3), and employment (column 4). Independent variables are corresponding foreign growth rates. Domestic and foreign growth rates are defined as ratios of changes
in activity between benchmark years to averages of the beginning and end of period values. All regressions are
IV specifications in which parent weighed GDP growth rates are used as instruments for foreign growth rates.
These instruments are calculated by first computing GDP growth rates measured as the change in host country
GDP per capita in between benchmark years scaled by average GDP per capita at the beginning and end of the
period. Values of real GDP per capita in current prices are taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006). These
GDP growth rates are then weighted using weights equal to the beginning of period net PPE in each country. All
specifications include period/industry fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for
clustering at the parent level appear in parentheses.

capital and labor demand. All specifications include complete sets of period-industry
fixed effects for two-digit parent industries in each period, and the standard errors
allow for clustering at the parent level. The 0.2578 coefficient in column 1 of Table
5 indicates that 10 percent greater accumulation of foreign property and plant and
equipment, as predicted by host country GDP growth, is associated with 2.6 percent
growth of domestic net property and plant and equipment. This estimated effect is
quite similar to that implied by the OLS regression reported in column 1 of Table
2. The 0.2387 coefficient in column 2 indicates that 10 percent greater foreign asset
accumulation is associated with 2.4 percent growth of domestic assets, though this
effect is of marginal statistical significance. There is no indication that firms accumulating capital assets in their foreign affiliates do so at the expense of domestic
capital accumulation. Instead, greater use of foreign capital appears to stimulate
greater use of domestic capital.
The dependent variable in the regression reported in column 3 of Table 5 is the
growth rate of domestic employee compensation. The 0.3692 coefficient indicates
that greater total foreign labor compensation is associated with greater demand for
domestic labor. This estimated effect is somewhat larger than that implied by the
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0.2454 OLS coefficient presented in column 3 of Table 2, though the two are statistically indistinguishable. Similarly, the 0.6550 coefficient in column 4 of Table 5
implies that greater foreign employment is associated with greater domestic employment.15 Further regressions (not reported) indicate that growth-induced changes in
foreign employment compensation per employee are unrelated to changes in domestic employment compensation per employee. This evidence is consistent with a model
of complementarity in which foreign employment compensation affects domestic
employment compensation through changes in employment levels and not through
changes in compensation per employee.
C. Sources of Domestic Growth

There are several channels through which foreign activities can influence the
scope of domestic operations, including cases in which foreign production requires
inputs of tangible or intellectual property produced in the home country. The regressions presented in Table 6 consider the effects of greater foreign sales on domestic
R&D and domestic exports to affiliates located abroad. Columns 1 and 2 report estimated coefficients from regressions in which the dependent variable is the change in
domestic R&D.16 The 0.3225 estimated coefficient in the OLS regression reported in
column one indicates that 10 percent faster foreign sales growth is associated with
3.2 percent more rapid growth of domestic R&D spending. In order to avoid bias
that might arise due to the joint determination of domestic R&D growth and foreign
affiliate sales growth, the specification in column 2 instruments for foreign sales
growth using foreign GDP growth rates.17 The 0.4991 estimated coefficient in this
specification implies a slightly larger effect, 10 percent faster foreign sales growth
being associated with 5.0 percent greater domestic R&D spending. Since foreign
operations stand to benefit from intangible assets developed by R&D spending, it is
not surprising that greater foreign investment might stimulate additional spending
on R&D in the United States.
Columns 3 and 4 report estimated coefficients from regressions in which the
dependent variable is the growth in a parent company’s exports to its affiliates. The
estimated 0.6642 coefficient reported in column 3 indicates that 10 percent higher
growth of foreign sales is associated with 6.6 percent greater exports from US parent
companies to their foreign affiliates. The corresponding instrumental variables coefficient of 0.6473, reported in column 4, indicates that firms whose initial investments
were concentrated in economies that subsequently grew rapidly tend to expand their
exports from the United States to affiliates abroad. These results are consistent with
15
Reliable inference from instrumental variables estimation requires strong first-stage instruments. The J. G.
Cragg and S. G. Donald (1993) statistics for the instruments used in columns 1–4 are, respectively, 37.27, 37.61,
28.58, and 9.58. Critical values computed in James H. Stock and Motohiro Yogo (2005) imply that conventional
5 percent level Wald tests based on IV statistics have actual sizes that exceed thresholds of 10 percent for the first
three specifications and 15 percent for the fourth. Consequently, there is no evidence of critical weakness in the
first-stage instruments.
16
Growth rates that serve as dependent variables in Table 6 are computed in the same way as other growth
rates. They are ratios of changes between benchmark years to averages of beginning and end of period values.
17
The first-stage results of this IV specification and the one presented in column 4 indicate that Parent
Weighted GDP Growth Rates are significant in predicting foreign sales growth rates.
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Table 6—Foreign Growth, Domestic R&D, and Domestic Exports
Parent R&D growth

Dependent variable:

Growth of parent exports to affiliates

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Constant

1.1877
(0.0335)

1.0017
(0.2439)

–0.1009
(0.2328)

1.7494
(0.0911)

Foreign sales growth

0.3225
(0.0318)

0.4991
(0.2316)

0.6642
(0.0373)

0.6473
(0.2525)

IV with parent
weighted GDP
growth?

N

Y

N

Y

Period/industry
fixed effects?

Y

Y

Y

Y

2,140
0.2184

2,140

Observations
R2

2,616
0.1145

2,616

Notes: The dependent variables are the growth rate of parent R&D expenditures (columns 1 and 2) and parent exports to affiliates (columns 3 and 4). Growth rates are computed by taking ratios of changes in measures
in between benchmark years to average values of measures at the beginning and end of the period. The regressions in columns 1 and 3 are OLS specifications, and the regressions in columns 2 and 4 are IV specifications.
Weighed measures of host-country GDP growth are used as instruments for foreign affiliate sales growth in columns 2 and 4. Instruments are calculated by first computing GDP growth rates measured as changes in host country GDP per capita between benchmark years scaled by average GDP per capita at the beginning and end of the
period. Values of real GDP per capita in current prices are taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006). These
GDP growth rates are then weighted using weights equal to the beginning of period net PPE in each country. All
specifications include period/industry fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for
clustering at the parent level appear in parentheses.

those presented in Table 5, in which domestic investment and employment growth
respond positively to changes in their foreign counterparts.
D. Robustness Checks

As noted earlier, scenarios exist that raise potential questions about the validity
of the instrument. For example, firms with considerable foreign direct investment in
a country might also export significant amounts of its final product from the US to
unaffiliated customers in the same country. If this were the case, local GDP growth
would be an invalid instrument, since high foreign economic growth would directly
stimulate domestic investment to meet US export demand. The first two regressions
presented in Table 7 address this possibility by including, as an independent variable,
a measure of foreign GDP growth weighted by beginning of period firm exports to
unrelated parties, constructed from BEA data that identify the destination of each
firm’s US exports to unrelated parties.18 It is also possible that real exchange rate
movements that are associated with differences in GDP growth rates might influence
relative prices in a way that directly affects factor demands by multinational firms.
The first two regressions of Table 7 also address this concern by including measures

18
In each of the first stages of the specifications presented in Table 7, parent weighted GDP growth rates are
significant in explaining growth in foreign activity.
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Table 7—Introducing Controls for Trade Patterns and Exchange Rates,
and an Alternative Instrument

Dependent variable:

Domestic net
PPE growth

Domestic
employment
compensation
growth

Domestic net
PPE growth

Domestic
employment
compensation
growth

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Constant

0.3898
(0.1649)

0.3085
(0.0459)

1.0029
(0.0181)

0.1654
(0.0702)

Foreign net PPE growth

0.2656
(0.1368)

Foreign employment
compensation growth

0.2503
(0.1184)
0.3343
(0.1577)

0.3888
(0.1372)

GDP growth weighted
by parent trade

–0.1212
(0.1381)

–0.1474
(0.1391)

Change in real
exchange rate

0.0289
(0.0512)

0.0340
(0.0469)

IV with parent weighted
GDP growth?

Y

Y

N

N

IV with parent weighted
GDP growth residuals?

N

N

Y

Y

Period/industry
fixed effects?

Y

Y

Y

Y

2,309

2,306

2,844

2,842

Observations

Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1 and 3 is growth of domestic property, plant and equipment (PPE), and
the dependent variable in columns 2 and 4 is growth of domestic employment compensation. Domestic and foreign
growth rates are defined as ratios of changes in activity between benchmark years to averages of the beginning
and end of period values. Changes in real exchange rates are weighted changes. A change is measured as the ratio
of the change of the real exchange rate to the average of the real exchange rates at the beginning and end of the
period. The weights correspond to the distribution of beginning of period PPE. Real exchange rates are computed
using nominal exchange rates taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006), and inflation is drawn from the IMF
International Financial Statistics database. GDP Growth Weighted by Parent Trade is the weighted average of GDP
growth rates, computed using weights equal to beginning of period parent exports to unrelated parties in a country.
Values of per capita GDP are taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006). All regressions are IV specifications.
Instrumental variables are calculated by first computing GDP growth rates measured as the change in host country
GDP per capita between benchmark years scaled by average GDP per capita at the beginning and end of the period.
Instruments in columns 1 and 2 weight host country GDP by beginning of period net PPE in each country. Instruments
in columns 3 and 4 equal residuals from regressions of GDP growth rates on its own lag, with these residuals then
weighted by beginning of period PPE in each country. All specifications include period/industry fixed effects.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the parent level appear in parentheses.

of real exchange rate changes weighted by a firm’s distribution of property and plant
and equipment at the beginning of each period.
Since not all parents are exporters, the use of trade share data reduces sample sizes
somewhat, but, as the regressions reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 illustrate,
the inclusion of trade-weighted GDP growth rates and exchange rates has very little
impact on the estimated effects of foreign capital accumulation and employment
compensation growth. Ten percent faster foreign capital accumulation is associated
with 2.7 percent faster domestic capital accumulation in the regression reported in
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column 1, and 10 percent faster foreign employment compensation growth is associated with 3.3 percent faster domestic employment compensation growth in the
regression reported in column 2. The estimated direct effects of trade-weighted foreign GDP growth and exchange rate movements are negligible in both regressions.
If firms with rapidly growing domestic activities choose to locate their foreign
operations in relatively high-growth economies, the results in Table 5 may not
accurately reflect the influence of higher foreign growth rates on domestic factor demands. In order to evaluate this possibility, the regressions presented in the
columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 use measures of unexpected host country growth as
instruments. Specifically, these instruments are computed by taking residuals from
a regression of GDP growth on its own lag, then weighting these residuals using
firm-specific weights that correspond to beginning of period levels of net property
and plant and equipment. The regressions reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 are
run on the same sample as that used in the regressions reported in columns 1 and 3
of Table 5, and the estimated coefficients are quite similar (0.2503 and 0.2578 in the
case of property, plant and equipment; 0.3888 and 0.3692 in the case of employment
compensation), suggesting that it is the unpredictable component of GDP growth
that is responsible for the results appearing in Table 5. An additional predictor of
GDP growth is available for 1999, when the IMF published two-year growth predictions for a large number of countries. Computing instruments by first regressing
GDP growth on its own lag and, when available, IMF growth projections, and then
weighting residuals by beginning of period net PPE in each country changes the
estimates very little.
The merger and acquisition activities of multinational firms raise the possibility
that the estimated impact of foreign investment on domestic investment might reflect
what happens when one US multinational firm buys another, thereby simultaneously
acquiring the target’s domestic and foreign assets. If this acquisition activity is most
prevalent among firms with foreign affiliates located in high-growth countries, then
it could be responsible for the pattern that is apparent in the data. In such cases the
estimated effect of foreign investment on domestic investment may offer a misleading picture of changes in factor demands, since acquisitions may entail purchasing
bundles of foreign and domestic assets that are not what the acquirer would otherwise desire. The regressions presented in columns 1–4 of Table 8 address this potential problem by removing from the sample observations of parent companies that
acquire other US parent companies or divisions of other parents.19 Columns 1 and
2 of Table 8 present OLS specifications of regressions run on the restricted sample
of firms. Estimated coefficients on foreign net PPE growth and foreign employment
compensation growth are similar to those obtained from regressions using the whole
sample and presented in columns 1 and 3 of Table 2. Estimated effects of foreign
changes on domestic activity in the instrumental variable regressions presented in
columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 are likewise similar to those presented in columns 1 and
3 of Table 5. Although the 0.1419 coefficient in column 3 is insignificant, it implies
that 10 percent foreign investment is associated with 1.4 percent greater domestic
19
The BEA data identify purchases of one US multinational firm by another and purchases of foreign affiliates previously owned by another firm in the BEA data.
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Table 8—Controlling for Mergers and New Entrants

Dependent variable:

Domestic
Domestic employment
net PPE compensation
growth
growth

Domestic
net PPE
growth

Domestic
Domestic
Domestic
employment Domestic employment Domestic employment
compensation net PPE compensation net PPE compensation
growth
growth
growth
growth
growth

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Constant

0.2828
(0.0240)

0.0320
(0.0220)

0.2967
(0.0408)

0.0075
(0.0375)

–0.0715
(0.0551)

0.2964
(0.0471)

–0.1337
(0.0759)

Foreign net
PPE growth

0.1944
(0.0164)

Foreign employment
compensation growth
IV with Parent
weighted GDP growth?
Period fixed effects?
Drop acquirers?
Focus on
new entrants?
Observations
R2

0.1419
(0.1118)
0.2318
(0.0164)

0.1679
(0.0318)
0.3023
(0.1286)

(8)
–0.0435
(0.0940)

0.5164
(0.4770)
0.1911
(0.0286)

0.6393
(0.2984)

N

N

Y

Y

N

N

Y

Y

Y
Y
N

Y
Y
N

Y
Y
N

Y
Y
N

Y
N
Y

Y
N
Y

Y
N
Y

Y
N
Y

2,469
0.6798

2,480
0.1307

2,368

2,367

605
0.3983

611
0.1043

570

569

Notes: The dependent variables are domestic growth rates of net property and plant and equipment (PPE) (columns 1, 3, 5, and 7) and growth of domestic employment compensation (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8). Domestic and
foreign growth rates are ratios of changes in activity between benchmark years to averages of beginning and end
of period values. The regressions in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 are OLS specifications and the regressions in columns
3, 4, 7, and 8 are IV specifications. Parent weighted GDP growth rates are used as instruments for foreign growth
rates. Instrumental variables are calculated by first computing GDP growth rates measured as the change in host
country GDP per capita between benchmark years scaled by average GDP per capita at the beginning and end of
the period. Values of real GDP per capita in current prices are taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006).
These GDP growth rates are then weighted using weights equal to the beginning of period net PPE in each country. The sample is restricted to nonacquirers in columns 1–4 and to new entrants in columns 5–8. All specifications include period fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the
parent level appear in parentheses.

investment. The 0.3023 coefficient in column 4 implies that 10 percent foreign wage
growth is associated with 3 percent greater domestic employment compensation
growth.
In a related vein, reported estimates do not capture the effect of a domestic firm’s
initial expansion in markets abroad. Since the IV estimation method requires the
use of beginning of period values of foreign activity, it is not possible to construct
an instrument for new foreign investment by firms without prior foreign exposure.
Firms initiating activity abroad are responsible for only a small fraction of aggregate
foreign investment, so their effect is unlikely to dominate the total responsiveness
of domestic investment to foreign activities.20 It is also possible to analyze a subset
of observations representing the first period following a firm’s foreign entry. The
20
See Appendix table 1 in Desai, Foley, and Hines (2005b) for data on the magnitude of entry relative to the
magnitude of growth of existing firms in the BEA data. The BEA data also allow one to consider the effects of
introducing an affiliate on exports from the parent. It is possible to measure average changes in parent exports
to unaffiliated foreign persons in a particular country during the period that a new affiliate appears in that country. During such periods, parent company exports appear to increase. The average change in unaffiliated parent
company trade, measured as the change in unaffiliated parent trade scaled by the average of beginning and end of
period unaffiliated trade, is 12.3 percent.
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r egressions presented in columns 5–8 of Table 7 are run on this subsample of observations. Sample sizes are, necessarily, very small (between 569 and 611). Nonetheless,
the OLS results in columns 5 and 6 are similar to those reported in columns 1 and 2
of the same table for the considerably larger sample of firms that do not merge. Point
estimates of the effects of foreign investment and foreign employment compensation
growth are larger in the IV specifications reported in columns 7 and 8, and only the
effects of foreign employment compensation growth are significant, owing to the
small sample sizes.21 Thus, there is no indication that foreign expansion is associated
with domestic contraction soon after firms initiate foreign activity.22
Although the main specifications presented include fixed effects for each two-digit
industry in each year, there is potential value in using more detailed industry classifications. Some countries may be dominated by small numbers of industries in which
firms experience common shocks that affect their foreign and domestic activities.
In such cases, the foreign and domestic investments of the firms, and the GDPs of
the countries in which they invest, would all be positively correlated. Alternatively,
large movements in certain commodity prices could affect domestic and foreign
activity in particular industries and be correlated with the growth of economies that
are host countries of US affiliates in these industries. In order to assess the possibility that these phenomena are important enough to drive the results, additional tests
(not reported) include fixed effects specific to each three-digit parent industry for
each time period in the data.23 The estimated coefficients are, again, very similar to
those reported in Table 5. To ensure that outliers or large firms do not drive the main
results, the specifications presented in Table 5 have been run as quantile regressions,
and they have been run using a sample that excludes the largest 5 percent of the firms
in the sample, as measured by total start of period foreign property and plant and
equipment. The results are, likewise, very similar to those reported in Table 5.
E. General Equilibrium Considerations

These estimated effects of foreign operations on domestic sales and factor demands
are identified by differences between firms in the growth rates of the foreign economies in which they invest, which in turn affect the rates at which firms expand
their foreign investments. As a result, the estimates are cross sectional in nature.
They reflect comparisons of the subsequent domestic activities of firms that invested
in certain foreign countries with firms that invested in others. The total domestic
effects of policies affecting foreign investment include price changes that affect all
firms and are not reflected in cross-sectional comparisons of some firms with others.
21
The first stages of the specifications presented in columns 3, 4, and 8 of Table 8 indicate that parent weighted
GDP growth rates are significant in explaining measures of foreign activity growth. The instrument is positive,
but not significant in the first stage of the specification in column 7, perhaps as a consequence of the small sample
size.
22
Selection issues could also obscure the results if firms expand domestically when they cease to operate
abroad. Because the data do not include detailed information about why firms leave the sample and do not track
firms when they terminate their foreign activity, this concern cannot be easily addressed. As it happens, not
many firms exit the sample, and those that do tend to be small, so they are unlikely to have major effects on the
estimated coefficients.
23
There are 101 two-digit industry/year fixed effects but 302 three-digit industry/year fixed effects.
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These general equilibrium considerations include changes in output prices of industries with significant foreign exposure, any endogenous effects on interest rates,
exchange rates, wages, prices of investment goods, and others. These endogenous
price changes are likely to attenuate, but not reverse in sign, the estimated firm-level
effects of foreign operations on domestic capital accumulation, employment, R&D
spending, and exports. In the absence of a complete general equilibrium analysis, it
is difficult to estimate the aggregate magnitudes of these effects on the US economy,
but there is, nonetheless, a presumption that the signs of aggregate effects resemble
those estimated on the basis of firm-level evidence.
IV. Conclusion

Manufacturing firms that expanded their foreign operations between 1982 and
2004 simultaneously expanded their domestic operations, and this relationship
persists when actual foreign expansions are replaced by predicted values based on
weighted growth rates of foreign economies. Foreign investment that is triggered by
foreign economic growth is associated with growing domestic capital accumulation,
employment compensation, R&D, and exports to related parties. These results run
counter to the simple intuition that foreign direct investment diverts domestic economic activity by firms undertaking the foreign investment. This intuition is based
on the notion that each firm has a fixed amount of global production, so any additional foreign production comes at the cost of reduced domestic production. Neither
firms nor economies operate on such a zero-sum basis, and the average experience
of US manufacturing firms over the last two decades is inconsistent with the simple
story that foreign expansions come at the cost of reduced domestic activity.
These results carry implications for US policies that influence levels of foreign
investment by US companies. The United States taxes the foreign incomes of US
firms, permitting taxpayers to claim tax credits for foreign income tax payments
and to defer US taxation of certain unrepatriated profits of foreign subsidiaries. A
system of taxing foreign income while providing foreign tax credits is commonly
justified by appeal to the principle of capital export neutrality, itself predicated on
the intuition that foreign investment reduces domestic investment on a one-for-one
basis.24 The evidence that domestic manufacturing activity does not appear to fall in
response to increased foreign investment spurred by foreign economic growth suggests that these principles and the policies they support are ripe for reconsideration.
If foreign and domestic investment are not substitutes, then it becomes more attractive to exempt active foreign business income from domestic taxation, particularly
given the benefits of improving asset ownership allocation by having a tax system
that satisfies capital ownership neutrality (Desai and Hines, 2003). Furthermore, this
evidence suggests that encouraging foreign policy makers to liberalize their markets
would benefit domestic firms and workers.
Public fears over the possible offshoring of economic activity have added force
to policy proposals that, if enacted, would limit the foreign activities of US firms.
24
The standard international tax theory is developed in Peggy B. Musgrave (1969) and Thomas Horst (1980)
and reviewed by Gordon and Hines (2002).
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Recent proposals include those providing specific incentives for firms that increase
domestic employment relative to foreign employment, and others applying US labor
and environmental regulations to activities in foreign countries. Whatever their merits, adoption of these reforms would very likely constrain foreign activity by US
firms. The evidence provided in this paper suggests that these initiatives may also
have the unintended effect of reducing domestic activity by the same firms.
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